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Distinguishing Starfish from Cobras:
The Importance of Discretion for the




Walking on a beach after a receding tide, a tourist saw a native frantically picking
up starfish and throwing them back into the ocean. The tourist, a worldly fellow,
asked the native what he was doing. The native explained, "I am throwing these
starfish back into the ocean so that they do not suffocate." The tourist asked,
"There must be thousands of starfish on this beach and hundreds of miles of
beaches. There are so many starfish. Can't you see that you can't possibly make a
difference?" The native, with grim resolve, bent down and picked up yet another
starfish. As he threw it back into the ocean, he replied, "It made a difference to
that one, didn't it?"'
Story Two:
Question: What is the difference between being bitten by an adult cobra and being
bitten by a baby cobra? Answer If you are the one bitten, nothing.
These two stories define the role of the bench officer in a juvenile
delinquency court fitness proceeding2 who, in cases involving offenses
specified in various subsections of section 707' of the California Welfare
* I would like to dedicate this Article to Justice Patricia Bamattre-Manoukian,
California Court of Appeal, Sixth District, and to thank her for her encouragement
and support for almost 25 years.
1. This is a paraphrasing of a story by Jack Canfield and Mark V. Hansen. Jack
Canfield & Mark V. Hansen, One at a Time, in CHICKEN SOUP FOR THE SouL 22-23
(Jack Canfield & Mark V. Hansen eds., 1993).
2. The objective guidelines for the conduct of a fitness hearing are listed in Cal-
ifornia Welfare & Institutions Code, § 707, and in California Rules of Court 1480 to
1483. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); CAL. R. CT.
1480-1483.
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b), (d)(2), (e) (listing offenses). Although the
lists of offenses in the subsections are similar, they are not identical, and there is
and Institutions Code,4 is asked to separate starfish from cobras and to
force the cobras to stand trial in adult court based on the five statutory
criteria.5
At the present time, there is a desire on the part of some concerned
entities within the juvenile delinquency system to change existing proce-
dures. These reform proposals include:
* putting more law enforcement officers on the street
* housing minors who turn eighteen years of age in adult prisons
* mandating sanctions for the commission of public offenses
* eliminating confidentiality by requiring law enforcement officials to release
names of arrested juveniles
* establishment of magnet schools
* holding parents accountable for public offenses committed by their children
* bypassing the juvenile court and letting the district attorney directly file criminal
actions in adult court for juveniles fourteen years of age or older
All of these proposals are laudable. Most, if not all, already exist in
one form or another. For example, there is already a provision on the
books to open up to the public and to the media certain types of pro-
ceedings.' There are procedures to house unfit minors in county jails
nothing apparent in the statutes that suggests a reason for the difference. See id.
4. All statutory citations are to the California Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise specified.
5. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a), (c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1996). The five
criteria are:
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
(2) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(3) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(4) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the mi-
nor.
(5) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to
have been committed by the minor.
Id. § 707(c).
6. For example, § 676 allows media and public access to proceedings involving
certain specified offenses. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676 (West Supp. 1996).
[Vol. 23: 805, 1996] Fitness Hearings
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
while they await trial in adult court.7 Parents have long been responsible
for damages caused by their children.8
Most bench officers realize that polemic makes good law review article
titles but poor law. Juvenile fitness proceedings may involve as much, if
not more, appeal to emotion as they do to logic.' There has always been
a desire on the part of those interested in the juvenile delinquency field
to review the juvenile court and probation department laws and proce-
dures in a critical and intellectually honest manner and to ensure that
the current method of making determinations of fitness or amenability
7. Section 707.1(b)(1) states:
The juvenile court, as to a minor alleged to have committed an offense de-
scribed in subdivision (b), paragraph (2) of subdivision (d), or subdivision (e)
of Section 707 and who has been declared not a fit and proper subject to be
dealt with under the juvenile court law, or as to a minor for whom charges
in a petition or petitions in the juvenile court will be transferred to a court
of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 707.01, or as to a minor whose
case has been filed directly in or transferred to a court of criminal jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Section 707.01, may order the minor to be delivered to the
custody of the sheriff upon a finding that the presence of the minor in the
juvenile hall would endanger the safety of the public or be detrimental to
the other inmates detained in the juvenile hall. Other minors declared not fit
and proper subjects to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, if de-
tained, shall remain in the juvenile hall pending final disposition by the crimi-
nal court or until they attain the age of 18, whichever occurs first.
Id. § 707.1(b)(1) (emphasis added).
8. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West Supp. 1996) (imposing civil liability on par-
ents for minor's willful misconduct); id. § 1714.3 (imposing liability on parents for
minor's discharge of firearm); Robertson v. Wentz, 232 Cal. Rptr. 634, 639 (Ct. App.
1986) (test for holding parent negligent for failure to supervise son); Reida v. Lund,
96 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104-05 (Ct. App. 1971) (holding parents negligent in supervising and
controlling a child).
9. For example, in a fitness proceeding, a bench officer will be reminded that the
minor is charged with offenses that, if found true in adult court, could require, under
the current Rules of Court and sentencing provisions of the Penal Code, that the
minor spend more than 25 years in prison. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61 (West
Supp. 1996); id. §§ 1170.84, 2933.1; CAL. R. CT. 421, 425, 426; CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); id. §§ 1170.1, 1170.95 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
It has been said that certifying a minor to the adult court starts him in "the first
step of a legal and social journey to the human trash pile." Mortimer J. Stanm,
Transfer of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceedings, Its Role
in the Administration of Justice, and a Proposal for the Reform of Kentucky Law,
62 KY. LJ. 122, 144-45 (1973). Use by counsel of such hyperbole is of no help to an
experienced bench officer.
for treatment under the juvenile laws is the most efficacious. A review of
juvenile delinquency procedures, or any legal process, is always healthy.
Currently, the mission of the juvenile delinquency court is the rehabili-
tation of the minor, and therefore the fitness hearing is an amenability
hearing. Use of guidelines to supplement the five statutory criteria em-
ployed in juvenile fitness proceedings-whether mandatory or adviso-
ry-will aid the bench officer in effectively conducting a fitness hearing
when the purpose of the guidelines is to attain the laudable goals of
uniformity, predictability, and immediacy of outcome. Nonetheless, the
legislative and executive branches of government must be aware that the
courts will view any reform proposals in light of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine. All three branches of government must recognize that
guidelines can create a general contempt for the juvenile courts when the
public perceives that a mandated result is too lenient or too harsh in
proportion to the offense in question or that the result otherwise
amounts to a bill of attainder. 0
MISSION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
The California Legislature defined the original jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court in a straightforward and simple manner:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of this
state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state
defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age,
is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to
be a ward of the court."
10. "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a
judicial trial." 7 B.E. WrrluN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, SUMIARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 416 (9th ed. 1988). Both the United States Constitution and the
California Constitution prohibits such a statute. Id.
Attainder, in former English law, [is a] penalty following judgment of outlaw-
ry or sentence of death for treason or felony. Attainder required the forfei-
ture of the property of a condemned person and of the person's civil rights
to inherit or transmit property to an heir, a condition known as corruption of
blood. A parliamentary act imposing attainder without a judicial trial was
called a bill of attainder. An English statute of 1870 abolished attainder in its
entirety. The U.S. Constitution in (Article III, section 3) provides that 'The
Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except
during the life of the person attainted.' Similar provisions are included in the
constitutions of some of the states. In other states all forfeiture of property
because of criminal judgments against the owners has been abolished.
Attainder, ENCARTA MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (Microsoft 1994); see U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 3.
11. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 602 (West 1984), 608 (West Supp. 1996). Section
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The general purpose of the juvenile court is to simultaneously protect
the public at large and each minor within its jurisdiction."2 Specifically,
the court seeks to preserve and to strengthen the familial relations of the
minor, only removing the minor from the home and asserting custody
when "necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection
of the public."13 Minors requiring protective services will receive those
services in the form of care, treatment, and guidance in a manner consis-
tent with both the best interest of the minor and of the public. 4 Guid-
ance, which may include punishment, will be given as appropriate for the
particular minor and as consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of
the juvenile court laws." In enforcing, interpreting and administering
the juvenile court laws, the juvenile court and other public agencies will
consider, consistent with the dual purpose of the juvenile court, the safe-
ty and protection of the public and the best interests of the minor."
Punishment, in the context of the juvenile court laws, means the impo-
sition of sanctions upon minors, which include payment of fines, perfor-
mance of community service without compensation, probation or parole,
commitment to a detention or treatment facility, or commitment to the
Department of the Youth Authority."' Yet, punishment under these laws
does not include retribution.'8
608 provides that:
In any case in Iwhich a person is alleged to be a person described in [Wel-
fare & Institutions Code] Section 601 or 602, or subdivision (a) of Section
604, and the age of the person is at issue and the court finds that a scientif-
ic or medical test would be of assistance in determining the age of the per-
son, the court may consider ordering an examination of the minor using the
method described in "The Permanent Mandibular Third Molar" from the Jour-
nal of Forensic Odonto-Stomatology, Vol. 1: No. 1: January-June 1983.
Id. § 608.
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a) (West Supp. 1996)
13. Id.
14. Id. § 202(b).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 202(d).
17. Id. § 202(e).
18. Id. The concept of retribution is an ongoing conundrum in juvenile court. As
defined in the common dictionary, retribution generally may mean either "something
justly deserved; recompense" or "something given or demanded in repayment, espe-
cially punishment." THE AMERIcAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d
ed. 1992). In a theological context, retribution means "punishment or reward distribut-
ed in a future life based on performance in this one." Id. From the minor's point of
One of the principal tasks of a democratic society is to nurture its children to a
successful, productive adult life. In the United States we rely primarily upon the
family to provide to children most of what they need....
Other institutions participate in the socialization process, notably schools,
churches, and recreational groups, but the fundamental authority for child rearing
resides with a child's family.
When the family fails or is unable to rear its child within acceptable norms,
society has an interest in intervening to achieve its own goals. Dysfunctional fami-
lies which are unable to raise their children within societal norms threaten the
viability of the order.
Our legislators and courts have recognized the importance of responding to
family dysfunction. Numerous laws detail society's response to a family which
cannot control a child's delinquent behavior, a family which cannot adequately
provide for a child, a family which cannot protect a child from abuse, or a family
which cannot or refuses to educate its child.
The ultimate authority for the resolution of these problems is the juvenile court.
The person given the responsibility for carrying out the mandates of the legisla-
ture is the juvenile court judge. There are many other persons and institutions the
child and family may encounter prior to reaching the court, but if all else fails, the
legislatures in the United States have entrusted the authority to address the prob-
lems facing dysfunctional families and children to the juvenile court."
THE FITNESS HEARING IS AN AMENABILITY HEARING AND
MUST FOCUS ON THE MINOR, NOT THE CHARGED CRIME
The fitness hearing is the procedure by which the courts are mandated
to implement the legislature's determination that certain juveniles, as a
result of personal lifestyle choices, are no longer amenable to the ser-
vices of the juvenile court. It is a "critically important" step of the pro-
ceedings affecting significant constitutional rights of the minor." In
Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established
threshold requirements for a fitness hearing under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
The decision as to whether a minor in California can benefit from the
resources available to the juvenile court is governed exclusively by sec-
tion 707 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. The Kent
court noted that "[ilt is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of jurisdic-
view, any punishment is retribution. Retribution, as used in the juvenile delinquency
arena, probably means punishment that is imposed without consideration as to wheth-
er it is designed to rehabilitate the minor.
19. Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court
Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 1 (1992) (miscellaneous footnotes, citations, and in-
ternal quotations omitted).
20. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
21. Id. at 560-62; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996).
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tion is a critically important action determining vitally important statuto-
ry rights of the juvenile." ' The juvenile court may waive its original ju-
risdiction only over those minors it finds, after a fitness hearing, could
not benefit from the resources available to the juvenile court.24 As the
California Supreme Court stated, "The certification of a juvenile offender
to an adult court has been accurately characterized as 'the worst punish-
ment the juvenile system is empowered to inflict.'"25
Section 70726 and the California Rules of Court 1480 to 1483 provide
the procedures required for a fitness hearing.2 7 Under Rule 1480, subsec-
tion (a), the prosecuting attorney may request a fitness hearing "[ilf a
child who is the subject of a petition under section 602 was 16 years of
age or older at the time of the alleged offense, or had reached the age of
14 but not yet reached the age of 16 and is alleged to have committed an
offense described in section 707(d)(2)."'
23. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
24. People ex re. Jesus G. v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. Rptr. 846, 847-48 (Ct. App.
1977).
25. People ex el. Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 789, 795 (Cal. 1985)
(quoting Note, Separating the Criminal from the Delinquent: Due Process in the
Certification Procedure, 40 S. CAL L. REV. 158, 162 (1967)). The court made this
statement in the context of a murder case. Id. A minor, if tried and convicted of
first degree murder as an adult, could receive life or a capital sentence. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1996). If found fit, a minor "convicted of a felony and com-
mitted to the [California Youth Authority] shall be discharged when such person
reaches his 25th birthday." CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 1771 (West 1984).
The [protection] therefore, is that petitioner-then a boy of 16-was by stat-
ute entitled to certain procedures and benefits as a consequence of his statu-
tory right to the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. In these cir-
cumstances, considering particularly that decision as to waiver of jurisdiction
and transfer of the matter to the District Court was potentially as important
to petitioner as the difference between five years' confinement and a death
sentence, we conclude that, as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner
was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social re-
cords and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by
the court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision.
We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of
constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
26. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.
27. CAL. R. CT. 1480-1483.
28. CAL. R. CT. 1480(a). The required notice for a fitness hearing is at least five
judicial days. Id. 1480(b).
The statutory framework of section 707 segregates minors into several
categories and assigns the burden of proving fitness or unfitness to one
party or the other, depending on the age of the minor and the nature of
the crime.'
A minor sixteen years of age or older will be presumed fit under sec-
tion 707(a) when the charged offense is any offense other than those
listed in subsection (b).' ° A minor fourteen years of age or older, but
under the age of sixteen, will be presumed fit, under subsection (d),
when the charged offense is any offense listed in subsection (d)(2).3 In
a fitness hearing under either scenario, the prosecuting attorney has the
burden of proving that the child is unfit."
Under subsection (c), a minor sixteen years of age or older will be
presumed unfit when the charged offense is any offense listed in subsec-
tion (b).' A minor fourteen years of age or older, but under sixteen
years of age, will be presumed unfit under subsection (e), when the
charged offense is any murder offense described in section 707(e) (1).to
707 (3)(e)(3),' Under these provisions, the burden of rebutting the pre-
sumption of unfitness rests with the child.35
The party who has the burden of proof then presents evidence on the
issue of fitness or unfitness based upon the following statutory criteria:
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
(2) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(3) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(4) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the
minor.
29. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707. "In a fitness hearing under section 707(a) or
707(d), the burden of proving that the child is unfit shall be on the petitioner, by a
preponderance of the evidence." CAL. R. CT. 1482(a).
"In a fitness hearing under section 707(c) or 707(e), the child is presumed to be
unfit, and the burden of rebutting the presumption shall be on the child, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence." Id. 1483(a). Because the minor is presumed unfit, it is
his burden, by a simple preponderance of the evidence, to prove that he is "amena-
ble to the care, treatment, and training program available through the facilities of the
juvenile court." Ramona R., 693 P.2d at 790 (citing California Rule of Court
1483(c)(4)).
30. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a); see id. § 707(b). The subsection (b) offens-
es include murder, arson, armed robbery, assault, rape, kidnapping, and caijacking.
Id. § 707(b).
31. Id. § 707(d)(1); see id. § 707(d)(2). The offenses in subsection (d) are virtually
the same as those in subsection (bO. Id. § 707(d)(2).
32. See supra note 29.
33. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(c); see id. § 707(b); see supra note 30.
34. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(e); see id. § 707(e)(1)-(3).
35. See supra note 29.
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(5) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to
have been committed by the minor."
Section 707 states that the minor will be presumed unfit "unless the
juvenile court concludes, based upon evidence, which evidence may be
of extenuating or mitigating circumstances, that the minor would be ame-
nable to the care, treatment and training program available through the
facilities of the juvenile court based upon an evaluation of... [the five]
criteria."17 Thus, although a minor may present extenuating or mitigating
circumstances to the court as part of the evidence to rebut the presump-
tion of unfitness, a minor is not required to do so.
The procedures described in section 707 are extremely important.
Findings of unfitness and fitness have been overturned by writ because
the juvenile court did not closely follow the section's dictates. For exam-
ple, in People ex rel. James B. v. Superior Court,' the trial court's
statement of reasons for the finding of amenability was "directly contrary
to the specific statutory procedure governing fitness hearings, constitut-
ing an act in excess of jurisdiction amenable to correction by extraordi-
nary writ."' In People ex rel. Zaharias M. v. Superior Court," the trial
judge found that the minor's participation in a bank robbery was a hei-
nous and sophisticated offense.4 The court refused to follow the statu-
tory mandate, however, stating instead that it had "to look to the totality
of the situation."42 In the grant of the People's petition for an extraordi-
nary writ, the appellate court found that "the trial court completely ig-
nored [the statutory and case law] precedents and instead fashioned its
own 'gestalt' approach to ruling on a fitness motion."43
The letter and spirit of section 707 seem to suggest that the only issue
of a fitness hearing is the amenability of the minor to rehabilitation un-
der the juvenile court. The California Supreme Court stated: "Whether
36. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a).
37. Id. § 707(c) (emphasis added). The Welfare and Institutions Code defines
"shall" as mandatory and "may" as permissive. Id. § 15.
.38. 175 Cal. Rptr. 733 (Ct. App. 1981).
39. Id. at 268. Specifically the trial court stated, "'I've read the police report and
the dispositions and procedures and available remedies and sources of remedies that
are present in Juvenile Court; they will suffice, and have not been totally exhausted.'"
Id. at 266 (quoting the record of the fitness hearing).
40. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838 (Ct. App. 1993).
41. Id. at 839.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 840.
the youth committed the act alleged in the petition is not the issue in [a
section 707 hearing]; the sole question is whether he would be amenable
to treatment in the event that he is ultimately adjudged a ward of the
court."" Alibi evidence is therefore irrelevant to and inadmissible at a
fitness hearing because a fitness hearing is not a culpability hearing; it is
strictly an amenability hearing.45
It is important to remember that, as a fundamental concept, courts'
must treat juveniles as individuals who must receive proper diagnosis
and treatment of psychological problems in order to adjust to society.46
If a minor is amenable and the juvenile court can be rehabilitate the
minor while protecting the public, all of the goals of the law will have
been accomplished.47 In fact, given that a juvenile court exists, an ame-
nable minor may have a right to rehabilitative treatment.8
If, on the other hand, a minor is not amenable and open to the care,
treatment, and training of the juvenile court, then the public cannot be
protected upon the minor's release from the juvenile facilities. Under
these circumstances, the court would be wise to send the minor to adult
court to face adult consequences. One must remember that rehabilitation
and public safety are consistent goals. Rehabilitation is a sure means to
the important end of public safety.
Section 707 examines the concept of amenability in divisible parts.
Graphically, section 707 establishes a "pie" of amenability containing five
"slices" of criteria. One must view each of these "slices" as a part of a
44. People v. Chi Ko Wong, 557 P.2d 976, 988 (Cal. 1976); see also People ex re/.
James B. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (Ct. App. 1981) ("The findings re-
quired by section 707 are a mandatory precondition to a determination of amenabili-
ty.")
45. People ex rel. Rodrigo 0. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 800 (Ct.
App. 1994).
46. In re William M., 473 P.2d 737, 748 (Cal. 1970).
47. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a) (West Supp. 1996) ("The purpose of [Juve-
nile Court Law] is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each
minor under [its] jurisdiction . . ").
48. Charles R. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. Rptr. 284, 291 (Ct. App. 1980). For a
juvenile to have this right may depend on fitness. See id.
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whole, rather than in isolation. Each criterion49 should be analyzed as it
relates to the overall concept of amenability to treatment.
To truly understand how specific criteria can be used to examine a
larger, more holistic concept, consider criterion number five, the circum-
stances and gravity of the offense.' Viewing this criterion in isolation,
with no connection to the overall purpose of the statute, a minor would
never be able to overcome it. Viewed without regard to amenability, a
minor's attorney would have to persuade a fitness hearing judge that
murder, rape, robbery, and all other crimes listed in section 707 are nei-
ther grave nor serious. Obviously, an attorney could never accomplish
such a task, and thus, a fitness hearing would become a mere formality.
The legislature did not intend such a result. In Edsel P. v. Superior
Court,1 the court wrote:
The Attorney General maintains that... the evidence presented against petitioner
at the fitness hearing was "overwhelming" and in no event would he be able to
overcome "[tlhe circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged to have been
committed by [him]. The Attorney General argues, in other words, that even if
petitioner has overcome the presumption that he is unamenable to the care,
treatment, and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile
court based upon evaluation of the first four of the five criteria specified in sub-
division (c) of section 707, he cannot meet the fifth criteri[ion] i.e., "the circum-
stances and gravity of the offenses alleged to have been committed by the mi-
nor"-because it is indisputable that the offenses alleged against him are among
the grave offenses listed in subdivision (b) of the statute. If we were to accept this
reasoning, which we do not, all fitness hearings involving a minor charged with
any of the offenses enumerated in sub-division (b) would reach a foregone con-
clusion and thereby be deprived of purpose. Such a result is impossible to recon-
cile with the language of section 707, subdivision (c), which clearly does not cre-
ate a mandatory or irrebuttable presumption."
49. The Welfare and Institutions Code does not define the word "criterion." The
dictionary, however, defines it as "[a] standard, rule, or test on which a judgment or
decision can be based." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGIi LAN-
GUAGE 314 (3d ed. 1992).
Section 707 states that a bench officer shall examine the issue of amenability by
separating the whole into parts and then using these parts as a standard of refer-
ence, or a yardstick, whether the minor is amenable to the juvenile court's care,
treatment, and training. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West 1984 & Supp.
1996).
50. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a)(5) (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); see supra text
accompanying note 36.
51. 211 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct App. 1985).
52. Id. at 876-77 (emphasis added in part) (quoting People v. Superior Ct., 173 Cal.
Rptr. 788, 794 (1981) (some alterations in original)).
It would seem, therefore, that section 707 does not ask the court to
decide whether the crime charged is "fit" for juvenile court. Rather, the
inquiry is whether the minor himself is "fit" for juvenile court. In essence
section 707 establishes a "minor-focused" approach for determining fit-
ness, rather than a "crime-focused" approach.
A crime-focused approach to determining fitness suffers from a second
fatal flaw. Consider, for example, a case in which the codefendants are
equally culpable. Under a crime-focused approach, an analysis of the
circumstances and gravity of the crime would determine the fate of all
codefendants without inquiry into the amenability of each individual de-
fendant. If Bench Officer A found a codefendant unfit using the crime-
focused test, it would no longer be appropriate to allow him to deter-
mine the fitness of the remaining codefendants because Bench Officer A
would have already decided the facts under criterion five for the particu-
lar crime committed. Recusal would be mandatory. Under the minor-
focused approach, however, recusal would not be necessary because the
bench officer would view each defendant individually to determine ame-
nability.
In conclusion, a fitness hearing is not a preliminary hearing. Its pur-
pose is not to determine whether the case has been overcharged. Rather,
a fitness hearing is used both to determine whether a minor is amenable
to rehabilitation and to consider evidence in mitigation as it relates Ito
the amenability of the minor, not as it relates to the crime in isolation.
Criterion five, viewed in the broad context of determining a minor's ame-
nability to care, treatment, and training, asks the court to examine the
circumstances in order to determine whether something can be learned
about the minor's amenability. For example, the court may ask: "Was the
crime committed in such a cold, callous, and vicious manner that it
speaks against the possibility of the minor being rehabilitated?" or "Do
the circumstances of the crime suggest that the minor is so antisocial
and disturbed that any efforts to reform his character through the juve-
nile facilities would be fruitless?" The court may find, however, that the
circumstances surrounding the crime demonstrate that the minor will
continue to benefit from the juvenile court's services. In this case, the
court must inquire whether the facts depict an individual who can be
rehabilitated despite his flaws. These questions are true to the language
and spirit of section 707 and may assist a bench officer in determining, in
a principled and rational way, which children are fit for juvenile court
treatment.
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JUDGES ARE THE GATEKEEPERS OF THE COURTHOUSE UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
In a crime-focused system, giving the prosecutors the ability to file
juvenile matters directly in adult criminal court will create problems with
the doctrine of separation of powers.
The California Supreme Court considered a similar separation of pow-
ers issue in People v. Tenorio.' In Tenorio, the court invalidated section
11718 of the Health and Safety Code,' which prohibited a court from
dismissing an allegation against a defendant unless the district attorney
requested it.' The court held that this statute violated the separation of
powers doctrine under the California Constitution because it gave
prosecutors the power to foreclose the exercise of judicial power.' The
Tenorio court explained that "[t]he judicial power is compromised when
a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests
of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before
he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor."57
Similarly, the California Supreme Court in Esteybar v. Municipal
Court' held that California Penal Code, section 17 (b)(5), as it was then
written, violated the doctrine of separation of powers.' At the time, sec-
tion 17(b)(5) of the Penal Code prohibited a magistrate from reducing a
felony to a misdemeanor unless the prosecuting attorney consented to
the reduction.' The Esteybar court invalidated this statute, reasoning
that "the exercise of a judicial power may not be conditioned upon the
approval of either the executive or legislative branches of govern-
ment."'
The Third District of the California Court of Appeal relied on Esteybar
in its Malone v. Superior Court62 decision. In Malone, the prosecution
filed a complaint wherein the wobbler charges were deemed misdemean-
53. 473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1970).
54. Id. at 997.
55. See id. at 993.
56. Id. at 996-97.
57. Id. at 996.
58. 485 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 1971).
59. Id. at 1147.
60. Id. at 1142 n.2.
61. Id, at 1145.
62. 120 Cal. Rptr. 851 (Ct. App. 1975).
ors under section 17(b)(5) of the Penal Code.' The People then ob-
tained felony indictments on these charges and dismissed the misde-
meanor complaints.' The court of appeal held that this procedure was
unlawful and therefore prohibited proceedings on the indictment.' The
court held that after the magistrate determined the offenses to be misde-
meanors under subsection (5), "the prosecutor's ex parte dismissal of the
action and initiation of a new felony proceeding would effectively frus-
trate the magistrate's judicial act. Were it permissible, that conduct
would unconstitutionally invade the magistrate's judicial authority."
Recent appellate decisions under the "Three Strikes Laws" have gener-
ated a cornucopia of case law that will aid all parties in addressing the
question of separation of powers by circumventing the juvenile court in
certain cases."
In People v. Vessell,' the court of appeal held that the three strikes
laws do not prevent a trial judge from sentencing a wobbler as a misde-
meanor under section 17(b)(1) of the California Penal Code.' The court
of appeal rejected the prosecution's contention that section 667(c), which
forbids probation, suspension of sentence, and commitment to any facili-
ty other than state prison in a three strikes case, supersedes the trial
court's discretion under section 17(b)(1)." The court of appeal in People
v. Trausch7 and People ex rel. Perez v. Superior Court' reached simi-
lar conclusions.73
A "direct filing" scheme without a judicial check on prosecutorial dis-
cretion raises questions of fairness and potentially infringes on the equal
protection rights of minors similarly situated, but prosecuted in a differ-
ent court. For example, assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury' is an offense under section 707 of the Welfare and Insti-
63. Id. at 852-53.
64. Id. at 853.
65. Id. at 854.
66. Id.
67. The "Three Strikes" cases in the following discussion are all very recent and
may be subject to further action by the California Supreme Court. See generaUy Janis
R. Hirohama, THREE STRIKES LAW CASE SUMMARY (1966) (discussing many of the fol-
lowing cases).
68. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241 (Ct. App. 1995).
69. Id. at 247-48; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
70. VesseU, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247-48; see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17(b)(1), 667(c)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
71. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (Ct. App. 1995).
72. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Ct. App. 1995).
73. See id. at 113-17; Trausch, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839-40.
74. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
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tutions Code.7" On the other hand, there are many types of misdemean-
or assaults that do not fall within the ambit of section 707, such as those
outlined in Penal Code sections 241(a) or 241(b).'6 As the California Su-
preme Court noted, "'When the decision to prosecute has been made, the
process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial
in nature.'"7 ' Any "direct filing" regimen should, therefore, have a judi-
cial proceeding similar to section 17(b)(5) 5 at the outset to determine
whether the matter is more suitable for the juvenile court.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
It must be kept in mind that certain and immediate consequences for
criminal behavior are vital to rehabilitate delinquent juveniles. Normally,
there are very few pretrial motions in juvenile cases, and cases with
serious charges, such as robbery or burglary, are routinely tried two to
three weeks after the arrest of a minor. Felony trials usually take no
more than two hours. Raising the stakes for juvenile defendants will
necessarily result in more pretrial search and seizure motions, more
preliminary examinations, more motions to dismiss, more jury trials, and
longer trials.' All of these will lengthen the time it takes to move a ju-
75. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b)(14) (West 1984 & Supp. 1996).
76. See CAL PENAL CODE § 241(a) (designating simple assault as a misdemean-
or), 241(b) (designating assault against certain state and municipal officers as a mis-
demeanor) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
77. People ex rel. Greer v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1164, 1169 (Cal. 1977)
(quoting People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal. 1970)). Recognizing the impor-
tance of the judicial role, one court stated:
This court's decision is that our legal system should be permitted to run its
normal course by appropriate submission of the issue of guilt or innocence
to a jury selected from the community rather than leaving that issue to the
disposition of the District Attorney as final arbiter of the case. If this court
is mistaken in this perception of its duty under the law, and if in fact its
obligation is to merely perform the ministerial function of giving "rubber-
stamp" approval to the District Attorney's decision to abandon this murder
prosecution, let an appellate court so instruct this court.
People v. Angelo Buono, No. A354231 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 21, 1981) (order of
Hon. Ronald M. George denying People's motion to dismiss in the Hillside Strangler
case).
78. See CAL PENAL CODE § 17(b)(5) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
79. In In re Javier A., the court of appeal concluded that although the minor had
been denied his inviolate right to a jury trial under § 16 of Article I of the California
Constitution, stare decisis required the court to uphold the denial of that right to a
venile case through the courts. While it is true that substituting adminis-
trative tribunals for judicial ones may save judicial resources, such a plan
is costly to local governments. Therefore, before eliminating one method
and instituting another, public officials must analyze all potential conse-
quences and make value judgments concerning the impact on county
finances.
Public officials should consider specific reforms. These include:
Increasing the number of probation officers.
Experience has shown that intense supervision of juvenile probation-
ers is useful and probably less costly than incarceration. The Orange
County Juvenile Probation Department reported good results with its "8%
Program," in which the Department uses a large portion of resources on
the eight percent of the juvenile population causing the largest amount of
crime. The Santa Clara County Juvenile Probation Department's "FOCUS"
Program is noting similar results. An increase in officers will enable juve-
nile probation departments to more effectively monitor the progress of
minors sent home on probation through electronic monitoring and unan-
nounced home visits for drug testing.
Developing diversion programs.
The war on the streets should be fought on the streets as much as
possible and not in the courts unless necessary. Local police departments
and community groups have been developing innovative programs to
keep 400 to 500 delinquents a year out of the court system. For example,
the City of Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety and the Santa Clara
County Probation Department have developed the Sunnyvale Youth Out-
reach Program. In this program, professionals interview young offenders
who participate in educational programs at the Department of Public
Safety. Parents and family members are also involved. The focus is on
accountability and responsibility rather than on punishment.
Increasing the capacities of the local detention facilities.
At-risk minors need to know that they will receive certain and immedi-
ate punishment for criminal behavior or probation violations.
Developing relationships with schools to provide better education for
minors.
Grade schools and high schools should develop programs in ethics and
morality.
Consolidate family, delinquency, and dependency courts.
Most observant judges believe that children become delinquent for
reasons that are usually attributable to their surroundings, such as a lack
minor in delinquency proceedings. 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 414-16 (Ct. App. 1984).
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of parental supervision, having parents who are negative role models, or
being raised in an environment that did not include education in account-
ability and responsibility. Other reasons may include substance abuse,
domestic violence, or the minors having been the victim of a violent
crime. A model developed by Judge Leonard P. Edwards proposes uni-
fied family courts, in which a particular family would be overseen by one
judge, one prosecutor, one defense lawyer per family member, and one
team of public sector providers. This model would ensure the account-
ability of all people who affect a child.'
Additionally, the California Center for Judicial Education and Research
is now making domestic violence a mandatory component of its judicial
training at the New Judge Orientation and the Judicial College. Judge
Peggy F. Hora of Alameda County has developed an annual one-week
program on alcohol and other drugs to educate judges about the relation-
ship between substance abuse, treatment, and domestic violence provid-
ed to judges as a part of continuing judicial education.
Realizing that William E. Bennett is right.
In a recent speech, Martin Luther King III said, "We must get a handle
on our children or they are going to wipe us out."
We must recognize that America has, to some degree, lost its moral
compass. Right-thinking people need to work to re-establish traditional
community leadership in the schools, law enforcement departments,
chambers of commerce, churches, community service organizations, and
youth groups like the Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts, little league, and po-
lice athletic leagues.
CONCLUSION
On occasion, starfish that are thrown back into the ocean may propa-
gate in an oyster bed and eventually wipe it out. However, a cobra may,
on occasion, provide a valuable service to a community by driving away
rats, which can carry bubonic plague. Fitness proceedings should contin-
ue to focus on the amenability of the minor in question and not on the
charged offense. To that end, judges should continue to have their cur-
rent discretion to determine fitness or unfitness for juveniles under sec-
tion 707 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.
80. See Edwards, supra note 19.

